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Editorial: Special focus on 'Dignity
takings and dignity restorations'
Penelope (Penny) Andrews
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Cape Town (2016-2018)
Sabbatical Scholar, Columbia University School of Law (2018-2019)

In her book published in 2014, We want what's ours: Learning from
South Africa's land restitution program, Professor Bernadette Atuahene
introduced two significant and inter-related concepts, namely,
'dignity takings' and 'dignity restoration'. Atuahene defined 'dignity
takings' as the confiscation of property that also involves the
dehumanisation of people so dispossessed of their property as well as
the deprivation of their dignity.
Atuahene argues that the appropriate remedy for a dignity taking is
dignity restoration, a concept based on restorative justice principles.
Dignity restoration seeks not merely to compensate for the legal
harm, but also to address the dignitas and social harm, thereby
restoring to those dispossessed their humanity. The process of dignity
restoration, she argued, may also serve to eliminate the vulnerability
and recognise and reinforce the agency of those who had been
dispossessed.
Professor Atuahene tracks these two concepts by examining the
processes of land dispossession and land expropriation in South Africa
during colonialism and apartheid and their devastating impact on
black individuals and communities (dignity takings). She then
explores subsequent steps taken by the post-apartheid democratic
government to 'make whole' those who had suffered from the theft
of their land, beyond the formal legal process of reparations (dignity
restoration).
In this volume of the African Human Rights Law journal, three
contributors examine dignity takings and dignity restoration in three
contexts: The first revisits this issue with a focus on the Popela
community of Limpopo Province in South Africa whose land was
expropriated; the second and third reach geographically beyond
South Africa to Kenya and Nigeria, and expand the conceptual
moorings of dignity takings and dignity restoration from land and
property to the criminalisation of same-sex conduct and the
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deprivation of the property rights of African women under customary
law.
In the first article, 'From reparations to dignity restoration: The
story of the Popela community', Atuahene and Sibanda explore the
plight of the Popela community who were subjected to dignity
takings by successive colonial and apartheid regimes. Their struggle
was a long and protracted one, but nevertheless offered significant
promise. This is because the post-apartheid democratic government
publicly committed itself not only to providing reparations to the
Popela community and others similarly situated, but also to facilitating
the processes of dignity restoration.
Pondering whether the South African government has facilitated or
undermined dignity restoration for the Popela community, Atuahene
and Sibanda detail a litany of legal and political gains and setbacks in
the land restitution process, culminating in a Constitutional Court
victory for the Popela community. The judgment signified a
comprehensive remedial approach to compensate for the dignity
takings of the Popela community and the beginning of the dignity
restoration project for them. Despite this legal victory, the South
African government failed to follow up on the judgment and provide
the relief accorded the community.
Atuahene and Sibanda highlight a lacuna in the effectiveness of
socio-economic rights litigation and the ensuing jurisprudence to
deliver on the promises of the Constitution to poor and marginalised
communities. They point out how court victories that explicitly
provide for remedial action to be taken by government are often not
followed by executive action in implementing these remedies. As an
example, they refer to the significant Constitutional Court decision in
Grootboom, 1 where a combination of indifference and incompetence
led to Ms Grootboom dying in her shack several years later, without
her and her co-litigants ever receiving the houses that had been to be
allocated to them.
Similar indications of official indifference and incompetence are
evident in the wake of the Constitutional Court victory for the Popela
community, while some in the community also suspect that
corruption may be at play in their situation. In a rather dispiriting
conclusion, Atuahene and Sibanda show how several years after the
court victory, dignity restoration still is not within reach for the Popela
community, although the members of the community remain
hopeful. The authors warn that the failure to engage in a meaningful
process of dignity restoration for the Popela community and others

1
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jeopardises the fledgling constitutional democracy, leading to greater
instability that will multiply across South Africa.
In 'From disgust to dignity: Criminalisation of same-sex conduct as
a dignity taking and the grassroots battle to achieving dignity
restoration', Shaw analyses whether the criminalisation of consensual
same-sex conduct in Kenya constitutes a 'dignity taking'. In pursuing
his research question, Shaw builds on Atuahene's scholarship on
dignity takings, as well as the recent work of legal scholars and social
scientists who extend the concept to other spheres of inquiry. These
scholars see dignity takings as a useful methodology for
understanding the range of dignity-related harms inflicted by the state
on individuals and communities.
Although Atuahene and other scholars have cautioned against
extending the concept of dignity taking that may dilute its analytic
potency, Shaw employs a 'body as property' framework to argue that
the criminalisation of same-sex conduct in Kenya constitutes a dignity
taking. He sees this framework as an effective way to illustrate that the
violation of the bodies of LBGTQ people by the state (through forced
medical and other tests), as well as 'othering' LBGTQ people (through
stigma) constitute both direct and indirect takings.
As in the property dispossession context, where reparations are not
sufficient, so too decriminalising same-sex conduct is insufficient for
the purposes of dignity restoration. Shaw points out that
decriminalising same-sex conduct is but one step in the process of
dignity restoration. What will be required is a range of legal and extralegal steps by the government to combat widespread homophobia
that continue to condone violence and discrimination against LBGTQ
people.
Shaw questions whether the activism and advocacy by civil society
advocates with the specific goal of decriminalising same-sex conduct
constitute a form of dignity restoration. He concludes that they
probably do not, since same-sex conduct as well as the resultant
queer identities remain a crime in Kenya, giving rise to a particularised
homophobia ready to be conscripted by opportunistic politicians.
In 'The shadow of legal pluralism in matrimonial property division
outside the courts in Southern Nigeria', Diala explores the issue of
legal pluralism and specifically the interaction of state and customary
law in Southern Nigeria. Building on the work of Atuahene, he argues
that the denial of women's rights under customary law to matrimonial
property in the case of divorce or death results in dignity takings as
such denial ignores the agency of women, especially in the economic
realm. Such denial also discounts the capacity of women to make
informed decisions regarding their contributions to matrimonial
property.
The author notes that dignity takings occur on two fronts. The first
is in the private realm, where men rely on customary law to deny
women equality in the marriage, in effect treating women as minors,
therefore depriving women of their rightful access to matrimonial
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property. The second is a public or state failing, namely, the failure to
create the regulatory conditions that might enable women with a
rightful claim to marital property, either through constitutional or
legislative means.
Diala argues that dignity restoration occurs through the
interventions of the state that are mindful of the power inequalities in
customary law and therefore act to redress such power imbalance in
favour of women. To demonstrate the point, he highlights the active
interventions of a government agency, the Social Welfare
Department, mandated to protect the rights of women and children.
These interventions, according to the author, are 'facilitating a living
customary law of matrimonial property', which in no small way
contributes to dignity restoration.
The concepts of dignity takings and dignity restoration provide an
empathetic and innovative approach to issues of harm and attendant
remedies. They centre the experiences of the victims and allow for a
fuller recognition of the dimensions and consequences of
dispossession, beyond the legal to include the human. Such
recognition thereby enables the restoration of dignity and humanity
for those previously dispossessed and allows for societal healing, social
sustainability and for democracy to flourish.
Professor Atuahene's intellectual contribution to land dispossession
through an analysis of dignity takings and dignity restoration has been
significant. This special focus furthers the discussion and will hopefully
spur scholars and activists to continue to expand our intellectual
bandwidth as we continue to address historical harms.

